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This paper examines Harry Brighouse’s and Adam Swift’s attempt to justify the 
family by appeal to the interests of both children and parents. According 
to their dual-interest account, adults’ interest in parenting plays a role in 
explaining why less than optimal parents can exercise legitimate authority 
over children. I analyze this claim and raise doubts about the existence of 
any fundamental right, which is non-derivative from children’s own interests, 
to parent understood as a right to control the child.
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One of the main questions to which Family Values offers an answer is how to 
justify the family given what its authors—self-identified liberal Harry 
Brighouse and Adam Swift—call “the liberal challenge”. By “the family”, 
Brighouse and Swift mean a childrearing arrangement whereby a small 
number of particular adults stand in fiduciary, and authoritative, relationships 
with particular children, but which is not exclusively justified by reference 
to the child’s interest. This is an anomaly for liberals, who believe that all 
authoritative relationships between individuals with full moral status ought to 
be justified by appeal to the interest of the party over whom authority is being 
exercised. As self-identified liberals, Brighouse and Swift take this challenge 
seriously.
The family is definitely not like this. Consider: First, there exist—or we 
can imagine—ways to rear children alternative to the family. Brighouse and 
Swift list some of them:
“[s]tate-regulated quasi-orphanages, in which children are raised 
by trained and specialised employees; [a]rrangements, such as those 
associated with Kibbutzim, in which child raising is shared between 
“parents” and designated child-raising specialists’ and [c]ommunes 
1 For comments I am grateful to Andrew Williams and to participants to an open 
session on academia.edu and in particular to John Baker, Sally Haslanger, R J Leland, Michele 
Loi and Erik Magnusson.
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in which a large group of adults collectively and jointly raises a 
group of children, with no adult thinking of herself as having any 
special responsibility for any particular child, and no child thinking 
of herself as the responsibility of any particular adult” (Brighouse 
and Swift 2014:70-71).
It may be that good families serve children’s interests better than any of 
the above alternatives – as Brighouse and Swift go on to argue. They draw 
on empirical literature to explain why children fare best when raised 
by loving and sufficiently competent adults, which are referred to as 
‘adequate parents’. But, as far as I see, this is not in itself enough justification 
for a child-centred account of the family, that is a defense of the family by 
exclusive appeal to children’s interests. We do not know how many adequate 
parents there are around, and have no reason to think that we can identify 
them (especially without serious violations of personal autonomy and 
intimacy). It may well be that childrearing arrangements other than the 
family would, on average, serve children’s interests optimally, even if the best 
imaginable way to bring up children is to give them adequate parents.2 But if 
there aren’t enough such parents, and if we cannot help enough people to 
become adequate parents, rearing children in the family may unjustifiably 
expose too many children to serious risks. The well-run orphanage, Kibbutz, or 
communal childrearing may be the best feasible arrangements as far as the 
children’s interests are concerned. If good versions of these arrangements—
but not of the good family—are feasible on a sufficiently widespread scale, 
the family is to be rejected on child-centred grounds.
There is a second reason why the institution of the family as is cannot 
be justified on child-centred grounds. If the family was merely meant to 
protect children’s interests we ought to give priority of access to parenting 
to people who would make best parents and who are willing to take over 
this role. This is clearly not the case, even allowing for the possibility that 
we cannot—usually—tell in advance who would make the best parent. But 
some cases are clear-cut: when a new child is born to parents who already 
have numerous children, and who we have reason to think are particularly 
bad at parenting, liberal states nevertheless grant custody to biological parents. 
At the same time people who are likely to make wonderful parents and who 
2 Veronique Munoz-Darde argued that the existence of the family is especially 
objectionable if we ought to give priority to the worst off: “whether or not a great many 
individuals are better off because of the existence of the family is irrelevant in settling whether 
the family would be one of the institutions of a just society.  What matters is whether the 
existence of the family ensures that the least advantaged members of society are better off 
than they would be with its abolition”. Her own answer to this question seems to be negative 
(Munoz-Darde 1998-9: 42).
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are more than willing to raise children remain childless due to inability to 
procreate and the difficulties of adoption. More generally, custody rights follow 
biological connections, absent special circumstances.
Now, the family defended against the liberal challenge in Family Values 
is different, perhaps very different, from the current legal institution of the 
family. Brighouse and Swift argue for more limited parental rights than 
what existing states recognize. Nevertheless, they do want to reject, rather 
than bite the bullet of, the ‘best available parent’ possibility. In their own 
words: “Would there be anything wrong with a system that distributed 
children to adults in the way that maximized the realization of children’s 
interests, even if it left out some adults who would be willing, and adequately 
good, parents?” (Brighouse and Swift 2014: 86). They think there would be. 
Not because children lack full moral status, which would make it unproblematic 
to allow parents’ own interest in authoritative relationships with children to 
determine what is a legitimate way of bringing them up.3 Instead, they defend 
a dual-interest theory of what makes the family legitimate. The reason why—
according to Brighouse and Swift—it is all right to settle for childrearing 
arrangements that are sub-optimal for children is the way in which childrearing 
makes a unique and crucial contribution to a fully flourishing life.
In their elaborate account of the value of parenting, Brighouse and Swift 
argue that adults have a fundamental moral right to be parents. The reason, 
in a nutshell, is that intimate and authoritative relationships with children 
are uniquely valuable for most adults; such a relationship is not “just 
another intimate relationship, valuable to both sides but substitutable for 
the adult by an additional relationship with a consenting adult” (Brighouse 
and Swift 2014: 88). Rather, they have a different moral quality, make a different 
kind of contribution to the flourishing of adults, and so are not interchangeable 
with other relationships. Because childrearing makes a substantial and unique 
contribution to adults’ flourishing, adults are said to have an interest-based 
right to pursue such relationships. The unique value of parenting, according to 
Brighouse and Swift, resides in the combination of four features which 
characterize parent-child relationships.
First, relationships between parents and children are structurally unequal, 
given children’s unavoidable, involuntary and asymmetrical dependency on 
the adults. By contrast, dependency in relationships between adults is less 
encompassing, often voluntary and more reciprocal. Second, parents are 
in charge of their children’s well-being and development to an extent to 
which people are not responsible for other individuals, with whom they 
stand in different types of relationships. To discharge this responsibility 
3 “Children are individuals distinct from their parents, individuals whose interests 
it is the state’s job to protect and promote” (Brighouse and Swift 2014: 5).
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parents need recourse to coercion and manipulation. Third, parents 
unavoidably shape their children’s minds—that is, their beliefs and 
interests. Finally, children are capable of loving their parents in a 
spontaneous, unconditional and non-ref lective way that is not to be 
encountered in other kinds of loving. The first three features of the parent-
child relationships generate the distinctive moral burdens of parenthood: 
responsibility for the well-being and development of individuals who 
are dependent on you and who cannot exit the relationship with you at will. 
According to Brighouse and Swift, it is valuable to meet this challenge, 
as part of a process of self-knowledge and personal development that most 
people find uniquely fulfilling.
The last feature of the parent-child relationship, that of spontaneous and 
unconditional love, points to the specific value of loving, and being loved 
by, children and to the source of hedonic value afforded by parenthood. It 
is thanks to these features that parenting is essential to the flourishing of 
(most) adults.
This account of parenting allows Brighouse and Swift to reject the ‘best 
available parent’ possibility, because adults’ fundamental interest in 
parenting limits children’s entitlement to being raised by the best parent 
who is willing to take over this role: 
“Within certain limits, adults’ interests in being a parent can trump 
children’s interests in having the best possible parents. No child has 
a right to be parented by the adult(s) who would do it best, nor do 
children as a whole have a right to the way of matching up children 
and parents that would be best for children overall. Both scenarios 
could leave perfectly competent parents missing out on the goods of 
parenting” (Brighouse and Swift 2014: 95).
If Brighouse’s and Swift’s defense of a dual-interest account succeeds, 
then adults have a right to parent that is sui generis—i.e. fundamental, 
grounded in their own interests—rather than derivative from children’s 
own rights to protection and care. This would not change the fact that a 
right to parent is an anomaly by liberal lights: liberals acknowledge no 
other entitlement to exercise power over another individual legitimised in 
part by reference to an interest—no matter how important—of the one 
exercising power.
But how could one go about rejecting this account of a sui generis right 
to parent? It does not look very promising to question the importance that 
raising children has for most of us. The evidence is very strong: most people 
want children, go ahead having them often in spite of serious adversity and 
in spite of the inevitable difficulties of the job, and many people agonize 
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for long periods of time over not being able to become parents. Nor does it 
help to note that not all people believe that parenting makes such a great 
contribution to their flourishing. As Brighouse and Swift themselves note, 
it is possible that the flourishing of some, but not of all, people depends on 
being able to parent well (Brighouse and Swift 2014: xx). Some people may 
be unable to parent well (even with help) and therefore parenting will not 
contribute to their flourishing. Other people’s lives may be so rich in alternative 
venues to flourishing, some of which incompatible with childrearing, that they 
will flourish best without rearing children. But neither of these facts mean that 
rearing children is not essential to the flourishing of those of us who can 
parent well and whose flourishing is not incompatible with parenting.
More promising, one may believe that we do not have a right to pursue 
fully flourishing lives—but merely to pursue sufficiently flourishing lives. 
This is a plausible thought, in a world of competing claims over limited 
resources. On this view, would-be adequate and willing parents who miss 
the opportunity to rear children do not suffer from a rights violation provided 
they have other, adequate, opportunities to flourish. An interesting way of 
answering this challenge would be to argue that, for people who can be 
adequate parents and who wish to parent, the failure to rear children somehow 
blocks other avenues to flourishing. For instance, as in some fairy tales, 
grief of being childless may cast a thick shadow over every other joy, or take 
away the drive to engage in other projects, or otherwise undermine the 
ability to pursue other worthwhile goods. But this is not what Family Values 
argues. Another way to try to rebut this challenge would be to note that 
raising children is not merely a permissible—and very valuable—activity, 
but a morally mandatory one in the sense that each generation has a duty 
to bring up a minimum number of children to ensure the care of those 
individuals in need of assistance and the continuation of some sort or 
political society.4 In this case, parenting would be a very peculiar activity 
that not only makes an essential contribution to full flourishing, but also 
enables individuals to flourish by doing what was their duty to do in the 
first place. Perhaps there is a fundamental right to aim at full flourishing, 
if thereby you also do your bit to discharge a collective duty. (Suppose, by 
analogy, that there was a duty to defend your country against unjust attack 
and that fighting wars was essential to most people’s full flourishing. Would 
that be a reason to allow all would-be adequate soldiers to participate in self-
defence, should they find themselves under unjust attack?)
I do not know if the last argumentative strategy could succeed, but note 
that in an overly populated world like ours it is very likely that the number 
4 I defend this view in Gheaus (2015). For other arguments why there may be a 
(individual) duty to have children see Smilansky (1995).
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of children that we (collectively) have a duty to rear might well be much 
smaller than the number of would-be adequate parents. If it were not possible 
for all would-be adequate parents to parent-as-dutiful-behavior, there 
cannot be a right to parent partly justified as dutiful behavior.
Above I have outlined what are, in my experience5, the most usual types 
of criticism leveled at Brighouse and Swift’s defense of a right to parent. I 
do not aim to draw a conclusion yet: on the one hand, in their favor speaks 
a very powerful widespread intuition that we have a right to rear children 
if we would parent them adequately. On the other hand, and against their 
view is the very plausible liberal belief that if you are denied a chance to parent 
either because alternative childrearing arrangements, or other would-
be parents, would serve children’s interests even better, you do not suffer 
from the violation of a fundamental right.6 In the remainder of the paper I 
explore an intuitive way to adjudicate between these two contradictory 
beliefs, and in conclusion I suggest a way of reforming childrearing in line 
with the liberal stance, while also vindicating the intuition that adults 
have a right to involvement in childrearing (a right which nevertheless falls 
short of a right to parent).
Much of the argumentative power of Brighouse and Swift’s defense of a 
dual-interest account of legitimate childrearing comes from their appeal to 
the unique value of parenting. In turn, this value derives from the unique 
combination of features displayed by parenting. Since their conclusion—
that there is a right to parent—coincides with an already widespread 
belief, it is tempting to think that a right to parent can really be justified by 
appeal to the combination of the four unique features of the parent-child 
relationship. And, since there is nothing quite like parenting in the world—
that is, no other relationship that displays all of the features identified by 
Brighouse and Swift—this connection (between the four features and the 
right to parent) is difficult to test. But what if other social relationships also 
displayed the combination of these four features? Would we respond with 
the same intuition that one’s interest in such a relationship can partly 
justify one’s authority over another?
Consider the following imaginary situation, meant to show how intuitively 
extraordinary parents’ rights are over their children (at least in the absence of 
certain empirical assumptions that do not figure amongst the reasons that 
Brighouse and Swift provide in their case for the right to parent). Imagine 
that, as a result of a natural cataclysm, a group of adult refugees reaches your 
country. They have nowhere else to go. You live under a just and benevolent 
5 From numerous conferences and referee reports to work in which I describe (and 
endorse) their account.
6 For a convincing elaboration of this, see Vallentyne (2003).
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government that automatically grants the refugees the right to stay and settle 
down in the country and, in due course, to become citizens. As it happens, 
the refugees come from a very remote culture, described by anthropologists 
as ‘primitive’.7 They speak a language that nobody has heard of before and 
nobody understands, and they do not seem able to pronounce simple words 
in your own language. They cannot read or write, and have never been in 
contact with any technologically advanced civilization. They do not understand 
how any of the machines work, and understand complicated social rules 
even less. They appear scared of traffic and large crowds. Their bodies are 
beautiful, fragile, relatively small, and unusually agile. They quickly acquire 
a wonderful reputation for being uncomplicated, trusty, direct, curious, 
affectionate and playful.8 For good reason, the belief spreads that having 
one of these refugees around can bring into your life a kind of joy and fun 
that nothing else could, and hence that an intimate relationship with one 
of them would be a special blessing. Moreover, these people are in much 
need of patient introduction into your own ways of living; somebody has to 
take over the job of socializing them. And you are right to think that 
engaging in such an extraordinary task would make a significant and unique 
contribution to your own personal development.
Now imagine that, after a few visits to the camp where the refugees get 
emergency lodging, you become particularly attached to one of them and 
from all you can tell the affection is reciprocal. Your new friend responds to 
you with spontaneous trust, joy, and unconditional attachment. You would 
like to spend as much time as possible with this person. Would it be a legitimate 
policy to allow you to lodge your new friend in your home and take upon 
yourself the entire responsibility, and with it the power, to ensure that her 
life goes well and that she acquires adequate knowledge of your society’s 
language, moral sensitivity and expectations, laws and customs such that 
she can, eventually, become an autonomous citizen? Moreover, would it be 
legitimate for you to have the authority to decide with whom she is allowed 
to spend time, and under what circumstances—i.e. to have the power to 
exclude others from having a relationship with her? Would it be permissible 
if the state gave you a right, against all others, that they do not undermine 
your relationship with this person?9
7 Perhaps these anthropologists are objectionably condescending; I apologize on 
their behalf.
8  So they are, indeed, very close to how 17th and 18th century Europeans imagined 
native inhabitants of America: they are a reincarnation of the bon sauvage.
9 This is a feature of the right to parent as defended by Brighouse and Swift: “those 
people given the job of parenting a particular child will have a right to parent that child in 
the weak sense that others will be under a duty not to undermine the relationship” (Brighouse 
and Swift 2014: 87).
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If you had the right to do these things, your relationship with the refugee 
would acquire the same combination of features that characterize 
relationships between parents and children, and which are said to generate 
a powerful interest in parenting and hence the right to parent. The relationship 
would be asymmetrical, and very difficult to exit for the refugee; it would 
involve significant moral responsibility on your part, given the power you 
would have to protect and shape the person in your care; and it would make 
possible a kind of spontaneous, unconditional and unreflective love that is 
not usually possible between adults. If people have a right to enjoy relationships 
that display the above combination of features, then you should be allowed 
to take control of the refugee’s life in the way in which parents control their 
children’s lives.
Yet, I contend that a policy allowing you to take control of the refugee’s 
life would be obviously unjust to the refugee, your powerful interest to 
pursue intimacy with her notwithstanding, unless—for whatever reason—
this kind of policy would best promote the interests of the refugees. The 
reason that would make it unjust is not its paternalism towards the refugees. 
Indeed, the refugees in this example need paternalistic treatment if they are 
to survive at all in their new environment and if they are to become autonomous 
individuals with a chance to lead their own life in your society. The reason 
that would make it unjust for you to take control of her life is that, if it were 
possible to promote her current well-being and future autonomy in a 
different way—for instance by letting her reside in the refugee center, or by 
letting her move in with someone equally willing and better prepared to 
serve her interests—it would be unfair towards her to ask her to move in 
with you. This is a first, liberal response to the imaginary case.
A different, related intuitive response is that, if it were possible to promote 
the refugee’s current well-being and future autonomy without locking her 
into any particular relationship, then giving you—or another private 
individual—authority over her would be wrong because it would make her 
subject to (perhaps benevolent) domination. This is a republican response. 
You may think that, since you have such a powerful interest in sustaining 
the relationship with the refugee, you are entitled to the necessary means 
for protecting the relationship—including the right to prevent others from 
forming and sustaining a close relationship with her. But a parental-like 
power to exclude other individuals in this way comes at too high a moral 
cost to the refugee, especially if is not necessary for optimal protection of 
her own interests. The fact that you have relational interests at stake here 
does not seem to make any difference.
Since the well-being and development into autonomous individuals of 
the refugees is a matter of public responsibility, social arrangements should 
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be sought that can best ensure meeting this responsibility. ‘Best’ may be 
interpreted as either ‘well-being maximization’ or ‘ensuring a certain level 
of well-being in a non-dominating manner’. Possibly, concern for the 
refugee’s well-being and respect for their moral status will indicate that they 
ought to live together with many other people: some fellow refugees and some 
of your co-citizens whose main occupation will be to provide welfare and 
integration to the refugees. Or, perhaps, it would be best for them to live in 
the home of private individuals—call them ‘hosts’—but have access to a broad 
range of intimate and caring relationships with many of your (socially and 
emotionally competent) co-citizens, without needing their host’s approval. In 
any case, it seems that it is exclusively the refugee’s interests that determine 
the ideal way of socializing them: The host’s own interest in pursuing a 
relationship with one of the refugees (even if this relationship was highly, 
and uniquely, valuable to the host) does not seem to do any work in settling 
the matter.
This story is obviously meant to provide a close analogy to the situation 
of parents and children. The two cases share the features which, according 
to Brighouse and Swift, generate parental rights. If your intuition is that 
these features cannot justify parental-like authority over the refugees, then 
probably they are also unable to generate a right to parent as defended in 
Family Values.
The same hypothetical case triggers a second intuitive reaction—at least, 
on my side. The fact that your interest in having an intimate and authoritative 
relationship with the refugee is irrelevant to your having rights over her. 
This does not mean that you do not have a right to pursue a long-lasting, 
intimate relationship with the refugee. Your interest in this unique relationship 
is, I assume, powerful enough to generate a right to pursue it. You may spend 
some time with her every day and provide constant company and guidance to 
her. You may decide to become one of the people whose main occupation 
is to work in the refugee home part-time or full-time until she is sufficiently 
autonomous to take charge of her own life and leave the refugee home. While 
the state would be wrong to allow would-be competent hosts to assume 
parental-like authority over one of the refugees, it would also be wrong to 
set up an institution of socializing refugees that denies citizens a chance to 
develop close and benefiting relationships with the refugees. If the citizens 
really have a powerful interest in entering and sustaining close relationships 
with the refugees, then it would be arbitrary to exclude some from having 
access to such relationships—assuming the relationships do not set back 
the refugee’s interests—in order to benefit others. Note that the pursuit of 
an intimate caring relationship with a person does not require a right to 
exclude other individuals from pursuing such relationships with her—it 
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requires only that nobody else have a right to arbitrarily interrupt your 
relationship with this person. (This is of course consistent with the possibility 
that the highest possible degree of intimacy, as well as the most secure kind 
of intimacy, requires the exclusion of intimacy with others.)
Perhaps the analogy carries over, again, to the case of childrearing. 
Parental authority—as we have it and as it seems10 to be defended in Family 
Values—comprises a right to exclude others from having close relationships 
with one’s child for reasons other than the protection of the child’s interest. 
And, as we have seen, a right to parent is justified by Brighouse and Swift 
by reference to the unique value of relationships of intimacy and authority 
with children. Yet, it seems to me, intimacy, more than authority, contributes 
to the value of the adult-child relationship. This is so especially once we 
acknowledge that being in a sustained intimate relationship with a child 
involves considerable responsibility on the part of an adult even if that 
adult does not play a full parental role. Indeed, the justification of a right to 
parent starts from the observation that for “most people, intimate relationships 
with others are essential for their lives to have meaning” (Brighouse and Swift 
2014: 87). and progresses by noting the unique value of parent-child intimacy. 
Similarly, it is appeal to intimacy with a child that most plausibly explains 
the common intuition that people ought to be free to parent and the possibility 
that some people’s flourishing could be irremediably undermined if they 
had no children in their lives. But the most problematic element of the 
parental right, in a liberal perspective, is the authoritative, not the intimate, 
side of the relationship. If it is possible to disentangle intimacy and authority 
in childrearing—both analytically and practically—the intuitive support for 
a right to rear children might be salvaged without need of taking exception 
from liberal beliefs.
Therefore, I suggest that Brighouse and Swift’s case for a fundamental 
right to parent is only partially successful: it fails to show that appeal to 
adults’ interests does any work in establishing a right to control the child. 
But it can show how adults’ interest in relationships with children grounds 
an associative right: adults whose company would not be detrimental to 
children’s interests have a right to seek and maintain close and caring 
relationships with children. Yet the claim to a right to control a child’s life 
must be grounded exclusively in the child’s interest, in which case there is 
10 “Seems” because Brighouse and Swift defend a child-centred view with respect the 
content of parental rights. Yet, they also say that the right to parent involves that others are 
“under a duty not to undermine the relationship” (Brighouse and Swift 2014: 87). But my 
making close friends with my neighbor’s child can—if the neighbor has no power to interrupt 
the relationship—undermine the child’s relationship with her parent.
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no sui generis right to parent.11
It is possible that more people will want to reject the pertinence of the 
analogy between welcoming refugees and engaging in childrearing, than 
to refute the conclusions I draw about the just treatment of the refugees. To 
do this, they would likely point to some empirical features that set apart 
parenting from my imagined example. Unless they are adopted, children 
are never complete strangers to their parents or at least to their gestational 
mother, in whose body they come into existence and develop for a while. 
Many believe that parents are inevitably more attached to their own offspring 
than they can ever be to other children (although there is a debate on 
whether the explanation is to be found in the fact of gestation or in genetic 
relatedness; if such special attachment exists, I think that it springs from 
gestation12). This alleged fact contributes to the belief that, in general, 
(biological) parents make the best parents for particular children. So, 
perhaps, you are inclined to think that, should babies come into the world 
unrelated to any particular individuals—should they, for instance, be 
brought by storks—we ought indeed to set up childrearing practices that 
serve their interests as well as possible, including the possibility of allowing 
the best available parents to rear them. But, in fact, babies come into the 
world from the bodies of other people and so you may also think that this 
fact settles the question of what childrearing practices serve best the 
children’s interests (the family) and who are the best parents (procreators). 
(For instance, you may be convinced by evolutionary biology.)
Therefore, the beliefs that the family is legitimate and that procreators 
have a (non-fundamental) right to rear their own children—that is, support 
for the status quo—can be compatible with a child-centred account of who 
has the right to assume authority over children. The compatibility depends 
on the above-mentioned beliefs that procreators are, on average, able to love 
their children best and that a child is best off in the custody of the person 
most able to love her.13 If childrearing within the family really is in the vast 
majority of children’s best interest, and if the beliefs concerning procreation 
and love are true, then it may be fine to settle for minor reforms of the family. 
But, contra Brighouse and Swift’s account, this would be based entirely on 
the child’s interest.
11 That is, as far as Brighouse and Swift’s argument goes. For a different defense of a 
right to parent as part of a dual interest account of just child-rearing see Clayton (2006).
12 I discuss this in Gheaus (2012) where I analyze, more generally, the normative 
import of gestation for a right to rear a particular child.
13 For more on this, see Munoz-Darde (1998-9: 45-46). For a child-centred account 
that is compatible with the status quo of raising children in the family, and perhaps with the 
raising of children in their biological family (as a default) see Archard (2003).
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